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Abstract Stem cell research and associated or derivative biotechnologies are
proceeding at a pace that has left bioethics behind as a discipline that is more or less
reactionary to their developments. Further, much of the available ethical delibera-
tion remains determined by the conceptual framework of late modern metaphysics
and the correlative ethical theories of utilitarianism and deontology. Lacking, to any
meaningful extent, is a sustained engagement with ontological and epistemological
critiques, such as with ‘‘postmodern’’ thinking like that of Heidegger’s existential
phenomenology. Some basic ‘‘Heideggerian’’ conceptual strategies are reviewed
here as a way of remedying this deﬁciency and adding to ethical deliberation about
current stem cell research practices.
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…one may be an excellent scientist without having the least idea of what one is really doing.
Alexandre Koyre ´
Beyond modern dichotomies
Anyone examining the contemporary bioethics literature is faced with a moral
framework of debate that, for the most part, appeals to the authority of either
utilitarianor deontological ethicaltheory[1–13].A multi-dayseminaron the science,
ethics,and policy of stem cell research in 2009 showed the limitations of a theoretical
ethical discussion and conceptualization that is framed by a troublesome dichotomy
of ‘‘pre-Enlightenment’’ (read here ‘‘religious’’) and ‘‘Enlightenment’’ (read here
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1 Lost, conspicuously, is any
critical engagement with the ontological and epistemological bases of these ethical
theories as expressed in late modern (eighteenth to nineteenth centuries) British
empiricism (J. S. Mill) and continental rationalism (I. Kant). Lost, therefore, is any
meaningful appreciation of foundational problems of late modern metaphysics (as
‘‘ﬁrst philosophy,’’ prote philosophia) and how these problems have inﬂuenced the
constructionofmoraltheory(quapracticalphilosophyorpraxis)inthemodernperiod
ofphilosophicalreﬂection.Inshort,muchofcontemporarybioethicsliteraturehasyet
to advance beyond the theoretical inﬂuence of late modern philosophy.
When contrasted with ongoing developments in scientiﬁc and technological
research, such as in stem cell biology, and the strident pursuit of potential advances
in medical therapy, the failures of biomedical ethics are staggering. The moral
implications of stem cell research are especially confounding. For example:
• The moral status of pre-implantation human embryos viewed through utilitarian
reasoning is not without its problematique. As Evert van Leeuwen says, ‘‘…the
debate will concentrate itself on issues of possible risk, success, and so on.
Utilitarian reasoning, in which the possible happiness of the many takes
precedence over the luck of an individual, is combined with questions concerning
the conditions in which the goal justiﬁes the means’’ [14]. Yet, it is quite
questionablewhethertheendseverjustifythemeanswhenbothmeansandends,as
in stem cell research, are causally indeterminate and variable in efﬁcacy.
• Similarly, viewed deontologically, ‘‘embryonic stem cell research poses a moral
problem, as it brings into tension two fundamental moral principles that we
highly value: the duty to prevent or alleviate suffering, and the duty to respect
the value of human life. The harvesting of human embryonic stem cells violates
this second duty as it results in the destruction of a possible human life. Both
principles cannot simultaneously be respected in the case of embryonic stem cell
research. The question then is which principle ought to be given precedence in
this conﬂict situation’’ [15].
• PerhapsevenmoremorallyconfoundingisarecentreportthatBritishscientistshave
created human in vitro derived (IVD) sperm from human embryonic stem cells
(hESCs), a process technically named ‘‘male gametogenesis’’ [16]. While human
IVD-sperm currently are not functional in the way natural human spermatozoa are,
the fact that human germ cells can now be produced is astounding because of
uncertainlong-termeffectsonthehumangerm-lineandthefactthatgametogenesis
experimentsinmicehaveprovenunviable.Indeed,thefactthattheUnitedKingdom
outlaws the use of human IVD sperm for human reproduction and requires the
destruction of human IVD-sperm fertilized ova within 14 days after fertilization
pointsto a problematic technique,despite its claimed therapeuticpotential for male
infertility. Dr. Robert Lanza states one problem thus: ‘‘What’s most concerning
about this potential technology is that anyone, young or old, fertile or infertile,
1 I am referring to a seminar, ‘‘At the Cutting Edge of Stem Cell Science…Ethical and Policy Issues,’’
held in June 2009 at Harvard University, sponsored by the Harvard Stem Cell Institute and the
Department of Bioethics of Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine, and speciﬁcally to
presentations given by stem cell ethicist, Insoo Hyun; see [6].
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Forinstance,ifyouhadafewskincellsfromAlbertEinstein—orperhapsevenahair
follicle from the Pope or Queen Elizabeth—you could generate pluripotent stem
cells. Any couple could go to an IVF clinic and have a child that is half say, Albert
Einstein, or perhaps Brad Pitt or Elizabeth Taylor’’ [17, 18].
2
• Finally,thereistheproblemofcellbiology’simmersion inexperimentsinvolving
transgenic techniques that create hybrids, cybrids, and chimeras,
3 which bring to
the fore what H. G. Wells in The Island of Dr. Moreau presents as the ethics and
aesthetics of horror: ‘‘In the physical extremity of the monster, the human and the
animal spheres overlap and the idea of an animal kingdom which is neatly
organized in species is being revoked’’ [21]. Transgenic research now includes
attempts to create transgenic primates with germline transmission (e.g., common
marmoset, Rhesus macaque), albeit governmental prohibitions are currently in
placeonthecreationofa‘‘humanzee’’(‘‘theanalogueofthemule’’)[2,22–26].As
inWells’sdramaticpresentation,weareleftinrealitynotwiththepropositionthat
thereis‘‘nothingreallydreadful’’atallhere,butratherwiththeonsetofrevulsion,
repugnance, and insight into abomination. At minimum, there is a ‘‘sentiment of
disapprobation’’ (al aDavid Hume) in the face of ‘‘a [seeming] strange
wickedness’’ in the choices being made, assuming them to be truly choices and
not mere happenstance. But, there is more than sentiment here, and the
disapprobation manifests itself in the union of the ethical and the aesthetic
(a unity of judgment) that is all the while ambiguous even as the propositions of
moral philosophy are held in ambivalent tension with the empirical claims of
reproductive biology. This is especially true of diverse conceptions of ‘‘species,’’
thereby raising the question of what counts as transgressing boundaries between
species
4—‘‘transgression’’ here connotes both empirical description and
2 Adding to the problematic character of this research is the charge of plagiarism in a component of the
published article; see Sarah Guy [19] and [18].
3 Dr. M. William Lensch (Harvard Stem Cell Institute) deﬁnes a ‘‘hybrid’’ as an organism that ‘‘arises
from the admixture of DNA at the cellular level,’’ such that ‘‘every cell in the resulting organism (or cell
line if in vitro) contains DNA from both original, contributing genomes.’’ A ‘‘cybrid’’ is deﬁned as ‘‘a
special case of hybrid wherein nuclear transfer (NT) is performed between oocytes and donor cells of
different species (human nuclei into cow eggs…),’’ with the ‘‘resulting ‘zygote’ contain[ing] nuclear
DNA of one species and mitochondrial DNA (mixture) of another species.’’ A ‘‘chimera’’ is deﬁned as
‘‘an organism containing two or more genetically distinct cell populations which originated from two or
more zygotes,’’ such that ‘‘embryo fusion results in a random distribution of cells from each original
embryo throughout the entire body of the resulting adult animal’’—‘‘unless one cell type has a
competitive advantage over the other.’’ Given ongoing research on integration of such cells, the U.S.
National Research Council and Institute of Medicine in 2005 published ‘‘Guidelines for Human
Embryonic Stem Cell Research’’ and recommended (3.c.iii), ‘‘No animal into which hES cells have been
introduced at any stage of development should be allowed to breed’’ [see 20].
4 For additional reading on the ethics of transgenic research, see Baylis and Robert [27] and Ourednik
[28]. For a pharmaceutical perspective, see GlaxoSmithKline [29]. Baylis and Robert write, ‘‘The idea of
ﬁxed or rigid breaks between species plays no role whatsoever in contemporary biology. Indeed, the
ﬂuidity of species boundaries has been revealed through the techniques of comparative genomics,
warning against the interpretation of species as unique types.’’
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cell scientists to use non-human primates as an assay system for testing the
developmental potential of human stem cells’’ [27].
The above examples illustrate that biomedical ethics continues to face signiﬁcant
challenges from extraordinarily imaginative developments in biotechnology, and
any appropriation of post-metaphysical thinking (that emerged in the twentieth
century) as it may apply to this domain of scientiﬁc research is clearly nowhere
within the mainstream of the current conceptual framework.
5
This thinking—transcendental or existential phenomenology, post-structural-
ism, and deconstruction—issues in a quest for a kind of deliberation that goes
beyond metaphysical essentialism, beyond the troubled epistemological dichot-
omy of empiricism and rationalism, and beyond the theoretical ethical
commitments of utilitarianism and deontology (without denying them a
reasonable provisional authority). One consequence of this contemporary thought
is that both bioethics and medical practice cannot but be characterized by a
failure to be sufﬁciently reﬂective of their metaphysical (ontological, epistemo-
logical) determinants. As Iain Brassington remarked, ‘‘medicine, at least at ﬁrst
glance, relies on reductionist metaphysics,’’ and ‘‘if this is correct, destructing
the metaphysics means, at the very least, a radical alteration of what ‘medicine’
is all about’’ [1].
This is an important insight. One can move away from mere utilitarian and
deontological moral commitments when one moves away from the metaphysical
doctrines of Western modernity. One can consider, instead, what twentieth century
existential phenomenology of the sort advanced by Martin Heidegger may
contribute to moral deliberation about a whole host of moral dilemmas present in
contemporary biomedical research and consequent innovations in medical practice.
We can ask, more speciﬁcally, What happens to our bioethical thinking about stem
cell research when one attains some critical distance from modern reductionist
metaphysics?
I wish, then, not to ask a scientiﬁc question as such but, rather, to conﬁgure a
meta-critique. The question here is, How might we think about the ethics of stem
cell research when the critical distance is that enabled by Heidegger’s post-
metaphysical thinking? In pursuing this question here, albeit in preliminary form,
my purpose is also to show that there is important post-metaphysical (Heideggerian)
thinking already in place on the general problems of stem cell research and genetic
engineering. As with the debate about advances in modern genetics in post-WWII
Germany, the central issue here is ‘‘the status of the modern scientiﬁc project
itself’’ [31].
5 Since I have mentioned Insoo Hyun speciﬁcally in relation to the Harvard stem cell seminar, I should
say that I am aware of Hyun’s earlier paper linking autonomy and authenticity. But he does so with
reference to ‘‘values,’’ a concept that is loaded with late modern philosophical content and which an
existentialist phenomenologist such as Heidegger engages critically because of ontological and
epistemological implications; see Hyun [30].
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It has been said that ‘‘Heidegger’s philosophy of science never amounted to
anything more than an element of his thought, and it certainly never became an
element sturdy enough to bring analytic and continental camps into dialogue on the
matter of science’’ [32].
6 Perhaps more discouraging, in terms of taking up
Heidegger’s thinking in relation to modern science, is Daniel Videla’s observation
that, ‘‘If the main trait of the condition of knowledge at the close of the millennium
is—as Lyotard has it—that science no longer needs to take recourse to any
philosophical (narrative, non-denotative) discourse to legitimate the production of
knowledge, one may well be entitled to ask what role, if any, is left to an academic
discipline that, having science as its object, calls itself philosophical?’’ [34]. Yet,
when Heidegger says ‘‘Die Wissenschaft denkt nicht’’ (‘‘Science does not think’’),
the production of scientiﬁc knowledge is centrally at issue.
The fact is that the sciences are positive sciences—i.e., they posit the object-
domain of investigation, even as they presuppose and do not directly query the
ontological status of the objects they investigate. Thus, the sciences remain
dependent on a prior clariﬁcation of a region of being, such as is accomplished by
philosophical thought. Heidegger reminds us of this fact phenomenologically
through the de(con)struction of the history of ontology, which is the project of his
Being and Time. Videla states the point precisely: ‘‘The task of the destruction of the
history of ontology must therefore undo the misguided interpretation of the being of
entities that has founded their ontological assignment as scientiﬁc objects of
research. It must be accomplished as a different ontology, one which is more
fundamental, in that it recalls long forgotten ontological assignment that precedes
scientiﬁc research’’ [34].
Of course, even though modern science ‘‘required metaphysics as its founda-
tion,’’ it is often argued that (empirical) science no longer needs ‘‘to refer to
philosophical characterizations of the real for its justiﬁcation’’; indeed, as Heidegger
himself has said, ‘‘the emancipation of the sciences from their philosophical
background is the most visible characteristic of the historical movement of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries’’ [35]. There is a problem with this claim from
science, however. At issue for post-metaphysical thinking in relation to the
methodology of modern science is the tendency of the latter to metaphysical
reduction, consistent with modern science’s uncritical appropriation of the
analytical dichotomy of subject-object that is central to the metaphysics of
modernity. ‘‘It is…an understanding of Being as presence [i.e., perceiving/
conceiving/disclosing beings merely with reference to the present mode of time]
that allows the constitution of objectivity in the different sciences’’ [34]. This is the
understanding of reality that the sciences give us, consistent with their tacit
ontological presuppositions carried forward through the diverse methodological
6 Alternatively, see Rouse [33], who argues ‘‘not merely that Heidegger made signiﬁcant contributions to
philosophical understanding of the sciences, but that philosophy of science was at the center of his project
and its development throughout his career.’’ This claim can be appreciated once Heidegger’s project is
situated ‘‘with respect to the epistemological anti-naturalism that was central to neo-Kantianism and
Husserlian phenomenology.’’
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while ‘‘the sciences have maintained the subject-object perspective of metaphys-
ics,’’ the problem is that ‘‘in the process of transformation, they have failed to retain
the meta-critical capacity which is one of the fundamental attributes of metaphys-
ics’’ [35]. The consequence of this failure of meta-critical capacity is that ‘‘all things
[in the physical world, including the human being] are interpreted technologically,’’
and ‘‘understood in terms of their social use or utility’’ [35]. Consider the point
being made here:
This is not to say that there is anything inherently wrong with technology. The
difﬁculty is that the scientist, viewing the world from the subject-object
perspective, becomes unable to conceive an alternative way of thinking. Tied
to the technological way of thinking, the scientist, and by extension most of
the contemporary world, lacks the ability to think outside this mode of
thought. In scientiﬁc debate, there is endless discussion of the nature and
validity of theory, but technology as such is not in question. A scientist does
not question whether the real is quantiﬁable. Rather, the validity of
mathematics is presupposed as the necessary starting point of any scientiﬁc
analysis. A particular theory may be questioned and even discarded, but the
adequacy of mathematics as a depiction of reality is not. [35]
Heidegger states the point that is important for the present analysis: the conception
of reality given here is that which conceives of all beings as present ‘‘in the sense of
calculable material’’ [36]. In short, the dominant mode of engagement of beings is
through a calculative thinking (rechnendes Denken) that seeks to become total, to
the exclusion of all other modes of thought. Accordingly, ‘‘The difﬁculty for
contemporary humanity is that as long as science is regarded as pre-eminent or
privileged, it is much more difﬁcult to step outside of technology and think of Being
in a new manner’’ [35].
Heidegger, in his Letter on Humanism [37], observes that modern metaphysics
interprets the human to be a rational animal (animal rationale), an interpretation that
conditions modern science’s conception of the human being in terms of the duality
and interaction of mind and body. Heidegger argues against this metaphysical
conception, asserting: ‘‘The body of man is essentially other than [that of] an animal
organism. The aberration of biologism is not thereby overcome even by the fact that
one annexes the soul to what is bodily in man, the mind to the soul, and the existential
to the mind…. That the physiology and physiological chemistry [biochemistry] of
man as an organism can be investigated in a natural scientiﬁc way is no proof that the
essence of man lies in this organicity, that is, in the scientiﬁcally explained body.’’
The point here is not to confuse the essence of the human being with the scientiﬁcally
explained body. Neither must one accept a reduction of the human to such a scientiﬁc
explanation, whether as a project of theory or experiment. The whole of Heidegger’s
thought works to overcome (U ¨berwindung) this conception, and thus to abandon the
subject–object dichotomy and mind–body duality, and to lead away from the
intensiﬁed objectiﬁcation of the human as a thing merely present-at-hand for a
cognizing subject. This overcoming of metaphysics occurs ﬁrst in and through
language, inasmuch as the essence (Wesen) of the human and of the whole of being is
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disclosure of our world, but it is the manner of this disclosure that is subject to
interrogation, insofar as the modern conception of the human ignores more
fundamental (ontological and epistemological) questions. That is why Heidegger, in
an essay entitled ‘‘Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics,’’ states that
insofar as modern science engages both facts and concepts ‘‘the way the facts are
conceived and how the concepts are established are decisive’’ [38].
Given the presumed independence of modern science from philosophy,
contemporary scientists who are steeped in their research projects and guided by
their scientiﬁc methods often ignore an important point: ‘‘a fact is only what it is in
the light of the fundamental conception, and always depends on how far that
conception reaches’’ [39]. This holds true for contemporary developments in
molecular biology, and thus also for technological developments consequent to
recombinant DNA research generally and stem cell science in particular. Heidegger
gives the examples of Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg, who distinguished
themselves as scientists of their day not merely by the theoretical or experimental
physics they performed but by the fact that they could and did ‘‘think in a
thoroughly philosophical way’’—‘‘therefore [they could] create new ways of posing
questions and, above all, hold out in the questionable.’’ To hold out oneself, as
scientist, in the questionable is a comportment of interrogation that questions the
research paradigm itself as well as the facts and concepts. Equally, if not more,
important is to interrogate ‘‘how and in what sense calculating and measuring are
applied and carried out, and what importance they have for the determination of the
objects themselves’’ [37].
To determine objects by way of calculation is to disclose the centrality of the
scientiﬁc method—‘‘the procedure, i.e., how in general we are to pursue things
(methodos), decides in advance what truth we shall seek out in things.’’ It is, says
Heidegger, ‘‘the primary component out of which is ﬁrst determined what can
become object and how it becomes object’’ [38]. Things become objects for a
cognizing subject; e.g., scientists theorize and experiment via a projection of their
being, asserting what they are and how they are. In The Question Concerning
Technology, Heidegger highlighted the problem of interpreting the human being as
if a thing merely ‘‘present-at-hand’’ (Vorhandensein, e.g., such as a tree is) and then
again as a thing ‘‘ready-to-hand’’ (Zuhandensein, such as tools or equipment).
Consistent with developments in technology, especially biotechnology, all beings
are gradually (though not inevitably or unavoidably) being brought into view as
‘‘standing-reserve’’ (Bestand)—things in general are engaged as ‘‘something
orderable’’ (bestellbar) and subject to this or that disposition (being disclosed,
exposed, reposed/re-positioned, transposed, disposed) consequent to human inter-
ests. There is, for Heidegger, a twofold danger here: (1) ‘‘the danger is that the
human being will ‘pursue and put forward only what is revealed in ordering and take
all of its standards from there,’’’ and (2) ‘‘every other possibility of revealing [i.e.,
the way the human conceives or perceives, thus discloses or un-conceals beings]
will be driven out and concealed’’ [40]. Rex Gilliland cautions, appropriately, that
the human being is not ‘‘merely a passive participant’’ in the way beings are
revealed [40]. Instead, the human is central to all ontological disclosure, and thus
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ontological status of beings.
In his 1953 lecture on Science and Reﬂection, Heidegger essentially calls for a
change of comportment: ‘‘Even if the sciences, precisely in following their ways
and using their means, can never press forward to the essence of science, every
researcher and teacher of the sciences, every human being pursuing a way through a
science, can indeed move, as a thinking being, on various levels of reﬂection and
can keep reﬂection vigilant’’ [41]. That call was recognized and taken up in 2001 at
the 35th Annual Meeting of The North American Heidegger Society with the theme,
‘‘Modern Science and Technology.’’ The theme was pertinent to the transition into a
new millennium and the question of human destiny in the face of the essential
connection of science and technology. The question of destiny comes to the fore
given the dominant role of science in society today, even though, as Heidegger’s
predecessor Edmund Husserl argued, ‘‘no empirical science could establish the
meaning and validity of scientiﬁc claims themselves’’ [33]. Heidegger, consistent
with his phenomenological insights into the metaphysical foundation of modern
science, accepted this claim. But he also challenged modern rationalism and
biologism, insofar as these perspectives uncritically carried forward ‘‘dogmatic
constructions’’ (as he noted in Being and Time), viz., mind (qua subject) and body
(qua object) as an indeterminate unity of animality and rationality, the indetermi-
nacy of which was to be settled (presumably) in the epistemological debates of
rationalists and empiricists. There is a hermeneutic presupposition at work in
Heidegger’s critique, viz., that all human understanding, including that of the
scientist, is achieved only relative to a ‘‘context of signiﬁcation’’ that is necessarily
both factual and conceptual. Thus, Heidegger expects that ‘‘the authentic
[eigentlich] movement of the sciences takes place in the more or less radical and
self-transparent revision of their basic concepts. The level of a science is determined
by the extent to which it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts’’ [39].
Heidegger’s concern here reminds one, of course, of the work of the historian of
science Thomas Kuhn, who distinguished between ‘‘normal science’’ and ‘‘revo-
lutions’’ in science, the latter occurring consequent to shifts in paradigms.
Commenting by way of incidental comparison, Joseph Rouse writes, ‘‘For Kuhn
as for Heidegger, ‘normal’ science avoids controversy over fundamentals in order to
develop with greater detail and precision its unquestioned conceptual and practical
grasp of a domain of entities. Left to their own devices, both [Heidegger and Kuhn]
thought, the sciences suppress any fundamental questioning of how their domains
constitute ﬁelds of possible inquiry’’ [33]. Applied to developments in molecular
biology, one can say that stem cell science moves forward by attending to an
iterative effect of facts and concepts available to it in the course of experimental
design, taking the molecular as a domain of entities it may legitimately disclose,
expose, repose, transpose, and dispose—as illustrated by all recombinant DNA
techniques, including somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). Stem cell scientists
review developments in their ﬁeld of research in terms of experimental procedure
(which concerns the efﬁcacy of techniques and reliability of experimental results)—
this is its ‘‘normal science,’’ presumably already warranted by the prior ‘‘theoretical
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entirely what is fundamental or even enigmatic to this scientiﬁc enterprise.
Controversy today is to be found at the level of conceptual innovation as well as
experimental design, thus one encounters the common criticism of stem cell
research on the basis of its anticipated and desired societal impacts. This may not
now be a controversy over the fundamentals of the science of molecular biology or
even of human embryology as such. Nonetheless, the temporal comportment of
stem cell research as futural (i.e., concern for the future of medicine as regenerative
medicine) calls for reﬂection on those fundamentals if the science is to show itself
adequately interrogatory from the perspective of meta-critique, such as concerns
Heidegger. Such a critique interrogates the presumed normative validity of the
research enterprise that is stem cell science, not merely with reference to its
experimental domain, but also and especially with reference to its historical context
of signiﬁcation (its ‘‘historicality,’’ as Heidegger would say). Despite its ‘‘progress’’
and ‘‘productivity’’ as science—i.e., disclosing the complexity of the molecular
‘‘world,’’ even as a disclosure of part of what is bodily in the human—scientiﬁc
knowledge does not eliminate the enigma that is the human being beyond his
‘‘embodiment.’’ For Heidegger, that which is enigmatic in the human remains ever
incomprehensible despite the progress of scientiﬁc research, for the enigma is
beyond the as yet undetermined unity of animality and rationality that modern
metaphysics thematized and sought to answer.
Consider, then, that in the same way that Heidegger says, ‘‘we can open a clock
and examine it’’ and then ask ‘‘Where here is time?’’ [42], so we can ‘‘open’’ a body,
extract a cell, examine it, and yet ask ‘‘Where here is the human?’’ That is not a
question the stem cell scientist will ask readily, given his project. John D. Haynes
states the point thus:
At the level of thing-ness (physicality, everyday, place, being-in-the-world) if
you pull a functioning clock to pieces and put it back together again either in
its same conﬁguration or in a different but nevertheless functioning
conﬁguration then clearly you understand it. But can you be said to know
it? Knowing it entails experiencing it as meaning. In knowing it the part
cannot function as the whole: the clock is, in this sense, without why. The
clock itself either as a hundred separate parts or as a hundred parts linked
together is no more than a thing…. But when the clock works it signiﬁes
something else: the present becoming the past or the future becoming the
present. At the level of being, understanding what it is that makes it tick does
not of itself establish a meaningful connection with what it signiﬁes (or points
to)…. The reality (meaning) of Time appears in the appearance or guise of the
clock as the object of thought and when its meaning is preserved intact, then,
and only then, do we know it. [43]
The analogy with stem cell research is clear: if one takes a functioning human
embryo developed in vitro as part of a procedure of in vitro fertilization, removes
from this embryo a stem cell, then manipulates that cell (perhaps numerous others
like it) with any number of techniques of cellular modiﬁcation (such as nuclear
transfer), then one (as stem cell scientist) can be so focused on understanding the
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it signiﬁes (or points to).
Explanation relative to a concept of causality is important to the basic sciences
and to medical ‘‘practice’’ in its appropriation of these sciences. Explanation, of
course, is part of the methodological commitment of cell biology and the stem cell
research project. Consider (stem cell biologist) Kevin Eggan’s characterization of
his research enterprise:
The genome is not merely a passive repository of genetic information.
Chromosomes are dynamic entities undergoing structural changes that
underlie development and cellular differentiation. We are interested in how
developmental and environmental cues induce heritable variation in chromatin
structure and how these variations regulate developmental potency, cell-fate
and gene expression.
The development of the fertilized zygote into a complex organism has
traditionally been understood as a unidirectional process, with cells in the
embryo becoming gradually more committed to a speciﬁc tissue type.
However, nuclear transfer experiments have demonstrated that the mammalian
egg can relieve the constraints imposed by cellular differentiation and return
the nucleus of an adult cell to a totipotent embryonic state. This process has
been termed nuclear reprogramming. The primary research focus of our group
is to understand the mechanisms by which reprogramming occurs. In
particular, we wish to determine the nature of epigenetic information that is
reprogrammed (i.e., aspects of DNA methylation and chromatin structure), the
times at which reprogramming events occur and the identities of the molecular
machinery that accomplish reprogramming. [44, italics added]
In the case of the research that Eggan describes, scientiﬁc explanation remains at
the level of the ‘‘anonymous’’ body and its cellular components, i.e., at a level of
experimental/conceptual reduction designed to explicate the stem cell scientist’s
‘‘objective’’ experience. In this experience, there is a ‘‘natural’’ organism—the
fertilized human zygote—the development of which has been observed and
explicated by developmental biologists (human embryology). This natural process
has been observed to be unidirectional from zygote to blastocyst to fetus, etc. Now,
stem cell biologists such as Eggan are on a quest to reverse the ‘‘natural’’
(unidirectional) process of organic development of cells extracted from human
embryos by ‘‘using nuclear transfer and other approaches’’ of cell modiﬁcation.
Seen as technique, this goes well beyond a mere observation of a natural
phenomenon.
Of course, as Hub A. E. Zwart reminds us, ‘‘Appealing to nature has come into
discredit in ethics and in public discussions’’ [45]. Nonetheless, what is natural
retains its relevance. Zwart argues, ‘‘the notion of naturalness is still part of our
moral experience… [W]hen we abandon any appeal to the moral signiﬁcance of our
biological nature, we are no longer able to express essential aspects of our moral
experience.’’ Going beyond what is ‘‘calculative’’ in a thinking that abandons the
relevance of the natural, and staying consistent with a Heideggerian turn to
‘‘essential’’ thinking (wesentliche Denken), Zwart asks, ‘‘To what extent does a
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7 Engaging the issue
of the natural that is challenged by genetic modiﬁcation, D. W. Lauer puts the
argument this way: ‘‘Leaving aside the residual issues of alleged beneﬁts and
possible misfortunes, I suggest that genetic modiﬁcation is something fundamen-
tally different in scope from traditional techniques of animal and crop selection. The
difference lies in the Aristotelian understanding of what a thing, in fact, is.’’ Lauer
reasons that (1) ‘‘a thing…is what it is by virtue of its speciﬁcity and ability to
maintain itself with particular limits (peras) that keep together their integrity and
give them deﬁnition,’’ and (2) ‘‘GM technologies violate the organic limit of the
organism and force that organism into instability where it is neither itself nor clearly
something else.’’ Lauer thus concludes, ‘‘This instability…can be understood as a
loss of foundation and grounding’’ [46]. Biologists after Darwin understand a move
from ‘‘natural selection’’ to ‘‘artiﬁcial selection.’’ Yet, as Lauer points out, ‘‘Even
artiﬁcial selection could not violate nature’s laws of reproduction.’’ But, with
genetic engineering, such as by nuclear reprogramming, we have an intentionality
(belonging to the scientist) that would (if it could;i fi tshould) control a molecular
process for a presumably noble purpose given the pressing human interest in
regenerative medicine. Eggan’s quest in the laboratory, therefore, discloses not a
natural experience, but instead, what Lauer calls ‘‘an engineered experience.’’
This engineered experience begins with the IVF techniques that generate the
excess embryos. As Evert van Leeuwen reminds us, ‘‘The existence of the human
embryo outside the womb is in itself a human artifact and its being totally dependent
on the circumstances in a scientiﬁc and technological context. Outside the womb it
cannot develop into a fetus, a child or an adult’’ [14]. With the engineered
experience of the stem cell extracted from a human embryo, we are witness to ‘‘a
transformation in our ontology of life in general.’’ For with the transgression, such
as through nuclear reprogramming, of a natural law of (unidirectional) reproduc-
ibility, a natural ‘‘existential determinacy’’ (what Aristotle understood as the
teleology of nature and what a molecular biologist understands as the cell’s natural
unidirectional development) quickly becomes ‘‘indeterminate,’’ not only at the
cellular level but also at the level of the life-world (Lebenswelt). Lauer writes that
‘‘Heidegger, in accordance with Aristotle, ﬁnds a limit to be an internal safeguard on
a thing by maintaining its identity. Evidently, the limit of a thing gives an entity
speciﬁcity and stability to make a claim to its own uniqueness. A limit, thus, is not a
defect or deﬁciency in a being. On the contrary, it is a beginning of a thing that
comes to stand on its own internal order of change and form’’ [4]. In nuclear
reprogramming, we have a presupposition that serves as the scientist’s projection of
an as yet unattained but desired reality. In Eggan’s case, genes responsible for
human neurodegenerative disease (e.g., amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), known
as Lou Gehrig’s disease) may be exposed and then re-posed or trans-posed through
such reprogramming, thereby providing ‘‘valuable model systems for the in vitro
study of these diseases,’’ i.e., ‘‘changing adult cells back into embryonic-like stem
7 Zwart argues that to retain appeal to the natural is not to advance a ‘‘naturalist’’ argument, but that
‘‘…naturalism posits that univocal moral acts can be deduced from a biological order of being. This
denies the constitutive activity of practical rationality; it is the duty of practical rationality to interpret the
moral signiﬁcance of biological data’’ [45, p. 73].
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relevant research result may be translated into therapy. But as Lauer adds, ‘‘As
Heidegger follows Aristotle, there, indeed, does seem to be the possibility for the
misappropriation of beings, of using beings unwisely, which would be violating the
organic limits that ﬁx the thing as what it is. Using beings unwisely potentially
means transforming beings or turning them into mere functions within an economy
of control. This would somehow deform the constitutional originality and stability
of an entity in favor of an outside author’’ [46, italics added]. With stem cell
research, it is already known that the various techniques in use deform originality
and stability given the high risk of oncogenesis due to ‘‘the continued presence of
transgenes encoding oncogenic factors and delivered by oncogenic retroviruses.’’
8
For the most part, a research project (such as that of Eggan) leaves aside the
hermeneutic of existence that is essential to human ways of being, which necessarily
goes beyond the question of means (‘‘Is genetic engineering (nuclear reprogram-
ming) safe?’’) to the question of ends (‘‘Should we engage in this kind of
research?’’). As Regine Kather observes, ‘‘Qualities hidden to our ears and eyes can
be made visible; yet in process they are quantiﬁed. Objectivity in the scientiﬁc sense
of the word can be achieved only if a theory is based on data independent of all
reference to human beings, to a ﬁrst- and second-person perspective. In order for a
measurement to be reproduced at any place and time and by any persons, all
qualiﬁed sensations must be excluded, as well as bodily expressions of intention or
meaning, emotions, aims, and even values’’ [49]. The same exclusion occurs in the
explanatory schemes of stem cell science.
9 Douglas Melton, co-director of the
Harvard Stem Cell Institute, for example, can assert, ‘‘all human cells, even
individual sperm and eggs, are ‘living’’’ [51]. This is a scientiﬁc claim, as is
Melton’s further claim that, ‘‘from the scientiﬁc perspective, this work [stem cell
research] holds enormous potential to save lives, cure diseases, and improve the
health of millions of people.’’ But, Melton goes beyond the domain of his scientiﬁc
competence when he adds, ‘‘The relevant question is ‘when does personhood
begin?’’’ He concedes as much when he opines, ‘‘That’s a valid theological or
philosophical question.’’ It is, in short, not a question to be answered by science,
certainly not by stem cell biology.
One consequence of the presumed exclusion of values from scientiﬁc research
such as that being pursued by Eggan or Melton is that, ‘‘no ethical statements can be
derived from the scientiﬁc concept of being’’ [49]. Thus, no ethical statements can
8 Kit Rodolfa adds, ‘‘While the recapitulation of this technology in human cells could address two
important challenges currently faced by the stem cell ﬁeld, the need to avoid immune rejection by
creating pluripotent cells genetically identical to a patient and objections of some to the use of surplus
preimplantation human embryos, this demonstrated connection to oncogenesis presents for now a
signiﬁcant barrier to such application.’’ The issue of identity is itself noted here: ‘‘[nuclear
reprogramming research] may be able to inform us about fundamental mechanisms of cellular identity.
How amenable is cell identity to being altered in this fashion? Can this approach be generalized to
reprogram a variety of different cell types?’’ See also Shimya Yamanaka [48].
9 The question of objectivity presupposes a philosophical debate, as yet unsettled, among philosophers of
science committed to the defense of realism (‘‘science gives us an account of the functional demarcations
of the universe as it is in itself’’) or constructivism (‘‘nature must be a cultural creation’’). For a discussion
with reference to Heidegger, see Dreyfus [50].
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the entities he discloses, even from that which he calls ‘‘blastocyst.’’ Yet, the
disclosure of the blastocyst does not remain at the level of the scientiﬁc techniques
in use, insofar as the concept ‘‘blastocyst’’ merges with the concept ‘‘human
embryo’’ and initiates an interrogatory move from the molecular level of
engagement to the level of lived human experience, thereby a move from scientiﬁc
assertion to moral evaluation. Melton’s evaluative assertion takes him outside the
domain of scientiﬁcally grounded assertion when he says, ‘‘The reality of the
suffering of those individuals [having chronic degenerative diseases] far outweighs
the potential of blastocysts that would never be implanted and allowed to come to
term even if we did not do this research.’’ Melton here measures the quantity or
quality of the suffering of many persons against the quantitative/qualitative potential
of the blastocysts that are unavoidably destroyed in the extraction of stem cells.
Tacitly, he performs a utilitarian calculation, privileging present and future persons
suffering from disease over blastocysts that are mere remnants of an IVF process
(‘‘mere’’ because they are not to be implanted in some woman’s womb and carried
forward to full term).
But, Melton’s evaluative assertion also makes the point at issue here: to see
properly the meaningful connection of the stem cell to what it signiﬁes (or points to)
is to see that this signiﬁcation itself is not molecular at all; the human beings for
whom this science and technology are being pursued are never reducible to their
bodies or to their cell biology. The ontology that is ever present here is not merely
the ‘‘gene ontology’’ with which the scientist engages and ‘‘represents’’ (vorstellen)
the objects of his research [52, 53]. Rather, one can ask, as Peter Wilberg does,
whether ‘‘illness is a purely biological phenomenon with an ‘organic’ or ‘genetic’
basis.’’ Then, pondering such a question, one may ‘‘see illness as something that
does not merely have a speciﬁc cause in the human body but a speciﬁc meaning for
the human being…. A phenomenological investigation of illness would explore the
close relation between illness and identity, the felt body and our own felt sense of
self, our immune system and its defences and the mental defences we erect to
preserve a singular stable sense of identity’’ [54]. Wilberg is here pointing to
Heidegger’s insistence that the human body is ‘‘no mere bounded biological ‘body-
object’ [thus, Ko ¨rper] but a living embodiment [thus, Leiben] of the human being’’
[55]. This embodiment or ‘‘bodying-forth’’ of the human, Heidegger says, is
‘‘irreducible to mechanisms’’ [55].
Surely, the science at work here promises to contribute to this or that patient’s
need for techniques of ‘‘regenerative’’ medicine, assuming the hypothesis of nuclear
reprogramming in the laboratory will lead to reliable therapeutic results at the
bedside. Yet, as a human being (read here present indicative sense, not substantive
present sense), this or that patient lives in a world of his or her own lived
possibilities of being, with the unique yet relational worldly signiﬁcations those
possibilities entail. All of this encompasses that individual’s potentiality for being,
itself much more than the individual as patient or research object. It is in relation to
this potentiality that science—stem cell science—must face interrogation about the
normative validity that it presumes to have.
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with the objects of his research in the micro-setting of the laboratory and the
meaning of that research in the non-theoretical, more encompassing, historical
context of his responsibility as a human being sharing a public ‘‘world’’ of diverse
engagements. The former is dependent on the scientist’s projection, given in the
experimental design he sets up: ‘‘Experiment begins with the laying down of a law
as its basis. To set up an experiment means to represent a condition under which a
deﬁnite conﬁguration of motions is trackable in the necessity of its course, i.e., to
being controlled in advance by calculation’’ [20]. This is the scientist’s calculative
thinking (rechnendes Denken), to be challenged, however, by an ‘‘essential’’
(wesentliche) or a ‘‘reﬂective’’/‘‘meditative’’ (besinnliches) thinking that is pursued
in meta-critique. The logic of the former should be alarming for the fact that, ‘‘with
the help of its results, it adapts itself for a new forging-ahead…’’—i.e., research
ﬁnds itself ‘‘having to adapt itself to its own results’’ [56]. (In fact, today, it is
meaningful to speak of a structural transition from reductionist molecular biology to
a more integrating ‘‘systems biology’’ [57].) The moral conundrums that continue to
be at issue in stem cell science (developments such as those cited at the outset of this
paper) are a demonstration of this phenomenon. Heidegger calls this phenomenon,
‘‘securing the precedence of their [the sciences’] way of proceeding (Verfahren)
over the entities (nature and history) that are being objectiﬁed in research’’ [56].
Rouse states the consequence relative to the meaning of the research enterprise:
modern science and technology are akin in that ‘‘each relentlessly overrides any
[wider normative] accountability that might constrain the expansion of its capacities
for calculation and control’’ [33].
Recent ‘‘heideggerian’’ commentary: Brassington and sloterdijk
10
Consider what Brassington means by ‘‘reductionist’’ metaphysics as disclosed by
medical practice (understood as iatrike ˆtechne ˆ). The ﬁrst point he makes is that: ‘‘In
a medical context, disease, healing, aging, and so on can be reduced to, or replaced
by, biological or chemical processes’’ [1]. These are ways in which medical
practitioners engage their subject matter. But, this is consistent with a conception of
modern technology such as that which concerns Heidegger: ‘‘In a nutshell, modern
science reduces things to their constituent parts and modern technology is concerned
with moving those parts around and into a certain order’’ [1]. This reduction is
problematic when the human being is conceived metaphysically merely according
to the mind–body dichotomy. The body and mind (reduced to brain matter as neuro-
chemical structure), in their constituent parts, are then disclosed to be subject to
technological manipulation and ordered as made possible by science and
technology, even when there is signiﬁcant doubt present about the intention and
consequence of such manipulation.
10 A note of clariﬁcation: By ‘‘Heideggerian’’ I do not mean a commentary that is either ideologically or
uncritically committed to Heidegger’s existential phenomenology. I mean simply a discourse that is
informed by his thought with a view to sorting out implications that bear upon bioethics.
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implicit in Brassington’s general statement about the effect of the reductionist
attitude: ‘‘…if the ‘true’ account of the world is reductionist, then there seems to be
little space for the human: a human is just one animal among many…’’ [1]. In other
words, to conceive the human being merely as animal, even as rational animal—i.e.,
to conceive the human merely as a unity of animality and rationality—is wholly
problematic from the perspective of the existential phenomenological critique of the
modern metaphysical project. The very fact that medical practitioners seek to
implement technologies that manipulate the human as ‘‘mind–body’’ (an assortment
of constituent biological and chemical processes) means that the human’s mode of
being is reduced to that which is body and mind as conceived by modern
metaphysics. The human is thereby subject to all modes of ‘‘disposition’’ (i.e.,
becomes disposable) in the same way that any animal is merely a ‘‘stock’’ resource
(‘‘ready-reserve,’’ Bestand, as Heidegger would say) for human disposition, for
processes of commodiﬁcation.
With reference to stem cell research, Brassington makes one observation: ‘‘we
might conclude that sperm and egg banks treat persons and gametes as a
reproductive standing-reserve’’ [1]. This would be true for both embryonic stem cell
material as well as induced pluripotent cell matter, which have human interest as
‘‘stock’’ matter (standing-reserve) for reproduction (manifest in IVF technologies as
well as stem cell therapies actual or prospective in efﬁcacy).
11 The question here,
for medicine, is how to conceive the human being properly without ‘‘disempowering
medicine’s ability to heal,’’ as Brassington says.
Sloterdijk and the ‘‘anthropotechnological’’ codex
Consider an academic controversy that had its airing in the public media of
Germany. William Saletan wrote an essay for the Washington Post in June 2007 that
is perspicuous for its title ‘‘Making Manimals,’’ and which links to what has been
called ‘‘the Sloterdijk debate’’ in Germany:
We’ve been transplanting baboon hearts, pig valves and other animal parts
into people for decades. We’ve derived stem cells by inserting human
genomes into rabbit eggs. We’ve created mice that have human prostate
glands. We’ve made sheep that have half-human livers. Last week, Britain’s
Academy of Medical Sciences reported that scientists have created ‘thousands
of examples of transgenic mice’ carrying human DNA. According to the
report, ‘the introduction of human gene sequences into mouse cells in vitro is a
technique now practiced in virtually every biomedical research institution
across the world.’…
According to the British academy’s report, ‘researchers have constructed ever
moreambitioustransgenicanimals’—somewithanentirehumanchromosome—
11 Indeed, Alex Mauron speaks similarly of ‘‘genomic metaphysics’’ [58]; he postulates, ‘‘the unspoken
premise that to engineer the genome of future persons in such a way that the genome of every cell is
affected (by germline engineering) somehow has more ontological clout than to effect some indirect
phenotypic change.’’
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into mice will continue.’…
We’re not doing these things because they’re creepy. We’re doing them
because they’re logical. The more you humanize animals, the better they serve
their purpose as lab models of humanity. That’s what’s scary about species
mixing. It’s not some crazy Frankenstein project. It’s the future of medicine.
[59]
Saletan’s remarks point to what is central to this therapeutic research—it is
conceived as a logical project of bioscience despite concerns about recombinant
technologies ‘‘transgressing’’ species boundaries. But, more telling, the logic here is
the logic of modern metaphysics, manifest in what Heidegger calls ‘‘calculative
thinking’’ (rechnendes Denken); it is a reductionist logic that seeks to disclose and
dispose of biochemical processes of mind–body merely according to a scientiﬁc
model of what it is to be human.
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As Babette Babich says concerning Heidegger’s characterization of the scientiﬁc
research project:
[T]he experiment requires a preestablished rule, a stipulated law, and this is
the basis of calculability and thus of calculation: ‘‘To set up an experiment
means to represent or conceive [vorstellen] the conditions under which a
speciﬁc series of motions can be made susceptible of being followed in its
necessary progression, i.e., of being controlled in advance by calculation.’’
And because such an experiment is the expression of a projected law, one has
both a criterion for as well as a limitation upon possible results. This is of
course the possibility of measurement and this is essentially not observation
per se.[ 60]
Thus, the human is conceived, even as the animal (mouse, pig, rabbit, etc.) is
conceived, as some ‘‘thing’’ (body) that is merely present at hand (Vorhandenheit)
despite claims of accounting for personhood and autonomy in the research
participant. Margrit Schildrick captures the problem even in bioethics when she
writes, ‘‘bioethics is out of touch…with bodies themselves, in the phenomenological
sense in which the being, or rather the becoming, of the self is always intricately
interwoven with the fabric of the body’’ [61]. Science, in short, is regnant in
determining the ontological status of the human being largely through this emphasis
on animal nature. Science is also regnant in its relation to bioethics, as the latter
discipline falls behind the pace of scientiﬁc research and ﬁnds itself reactive to,
rather than guiding, bioscientists on the moral boundaries of rapid developments in
molecular science and associated or derivative technologies.
It is precisely this project that, in part, motivated the German philosopher Peter
Sloterdijk to deliver an important speech, albeit controversial for ‘‘German
academia,’’ in the summer of 1999 entitled Regeln fu ¨r den Menschenpark: Ein
Antwortschreiben zum Brief u ¨ber den Humanismus (Rules for the Human Zoo: A
Commentary on the Letter on Humanism). The title of Sloterdijk’s talk refers to
12 For a discussion of Heidegger and changing historical conceptions of science, see Babich [60].
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classical humanism, i.e., articulated as Plato’s ‘‘doctrine of truth’’ (with its
ontological and epistemological presuppositions and ethico-political motivations)
that governs, as architectonic doctrine, the Western philosophical tradition.
Sloterdijk’s remarks have been reviewed by Mary Rorty, who concerns herself
with ‘‘the role of bioethics—and bioethicists—in public controversies.’’ Rorty ﬁnds
in Sloterdijk’s discourse a concern with what is at stake in humanism, viz., ‘‘the
speciﬁcation of man with respect to his biological capacities and his moral
ambivalence.’’ She identiﬁes ‘‘two ambiguities’’ in Sloterdijk’s discourse:
One was the distinction—or is it really a conﬂation—of a descriptive
‘‘anthropotechnological codex’’ which is currently in the process of being
written by geneticists and biomedical scientists—a book currently far from
completion, but already productive of a cascade of predictions and hopes; and
‘‘the rules for the human zoo’’—the normative stipulations about what kind of
genetic experimentation, research and intervention will meet ethical standards
for the protection of human subjects and human rights. [62]
Rorty then asks the salient question that is suggested by Sloterdijk’s oblique
discourse: ‘‘Did he [Sloterdijk] really think that knowing what was possible was
directly equivalent to determining what could be allowed?’’
This is a central question for anyone concerned with developments in genetic
engineering, stem cell research, and the host of technologies being translated into
therapies. Scientists working in this domain continue to press at the limits of an
inviolable human ﬁnitude, seeking to know what is possible of their projects of
uncovering the elements, forces, and processes of ‘‘nature’’ (in its reductionist
sense). So an attitude of moral ambivalence among some scientists and the public
yields to a strident thrust at possibility, a thrust without an adequate conception of
the human being. The inadequacy of both utilitarian and deontological moral theory
in the face of these bio-possibilities makes the confounding problem all the more
urgent; what could be allowed is willy-nilly installed as if it should be allowed, and
more often than not, installed as a matter of drift if not by explicit design in the
sense that the latter is the outcome of deliberative discourse (e.g., in public
consensus on a policy of eugenics, even though eugenics may issue as an occult
practice and thus as a violation of norms of research integrity).
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Yet, as Sigrid Graumann says, ‘‘It is a part of the concept that democratic
societies have of themselves that the public negotiates the legitimacy of scientiﬁc
and technological innovations, and political decisions are expected to refer to public
opinion’’ [3]. When public opinion is less deliberative than it can be and is much
more deferring to the anthropotechnological ‘‘codex’’ being installed by scientiﬁc
research, then the scientiﬁc model of the human becomes total (‘‘driving out every
other possibility of revealing’’ [41]), and the authority of public opinion is
13 Recall here the case of the South Korean scientist, Hwang Woo Suk of Seoul National University,
accused in December 2005 of fabricating research results in what at the time was considered ‘‘a landmark
study’’ in human embryonic stem cell research (therapeutic cloning involving individualized stem cell
lines). His report was initially published in the journal Science in May 2005. See here Demick and Kaplan
[63], Resnik et al. [64], and Rossner [65].
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wholly biologically through the impulse of bioscience’s technological instrumen-
tality. This presents an immediate challenge to bioethicists, for the ‘‘question of
which social reality we want to live in the future is entirely a question of ethics. The
aim of applied ethics should therefore not be reduced to the evaluation of concrete
and currently relevant innovations in the biosciences and biomedicine. Applied
ethics can not escape being involved in the creative processes of dynamically
changing social values and norms, world-views, and collective conviction and belief
systems’’ [3].
This engagement with changing social values was at the heart of Sloterdijk’s
lecture, even as he sought to move beyond Heidegger’s views as laid out in the
latter’s ‘‘Letter on Humanism’’ [11]. But, for Heidegger, this would mean
questioning the Western metaphysical tradition according to which humanity is
conceived merely as a unity of animality and rationality. It would mean
understanding ﬁrst of all that this unity is by no means determined merely because
it is conceptualized, but that it may be determined by the regnant claims of science
and technology, and may thereby undermine the ‘‘authentic’’ disclosure of the
human way to be.
The relevance of ‘‘authenticity’’ (Eigentlichkeit)
‘‘Authenticity’’ is a concept introduced by Heidegger in his magnum opus, Being
and Time (1927). It is a concept that differs importantly from Kant’s concept of
autonomy, as well as the ‘‘Kantian’’ concept of autonomy that has become a basic
principle of medical ethics.
14 For an exemplary engagement of the concept of
authenticity as it applies to medical ethics, let us review brieﬂy what Jos Welie has
to say [67].
Welie beginsbystatinganimportantobservationinlinewithHeidegger’sthought:
‘‘Since it is impossible to know what is in the best interests of other human beings,
they themselves should determine their own course of life’’ [67]. This statement
relates immediately to Welie’s further observation that there is in contemporary
bioethics discourse inadequate engagement of the underlying philosophical anthro-
pology. When this is engaged critically one ﬁnds that the so-called ‘‘virtue of self-
sufﬁciency’’ proper to libertarian political and moral philosophy is conceived such
that‘‘anysocialactswillalwaysbeamatterofcharityorphilanthropy,beingtherefore
not obligatory’’ [67]. The concepts of autonomy and duty thereby lose their purchase
in most, if not all, social and political relations and moral deliberation. Yet, the
practice of medicine is concerned with individuals who, as patients, are not self-
sufﬁcient with respect to the management of their disease and well-being, both
physical and psychological. The individual as patient, even as research subject, is
sometimes subordinate to the conditions of life, despite appeals to autonomy and the
right to his or her own ‘‘creative power’’ or ‘‘freedom to shape one’s own, worldly
life’’ [67].
14 For the distinction between these two concepts of autonomy, see Secker [66].
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thought: (a) thrownness (Geworfenheit) and (b) resoluteness (Entschlossenheit).
Welie states the former in a reasonably understandable way, as follows:
A human not only is a creative being; there is also the facticity of human
existence. The human being is ‘‘thrown’’ into life from the very beginning of
conception. There is a particular physical and psychological constitution and
health status that are ‘‘givens’’ to a large extent. There is historical,
geographical and social situatedness which, even if changed in the course of
life, is always exchanged but never undone. And then there is an even more
fundamental ‘‘thrownness’’: Whatever free choices individuals make, they
must always choose between alternatives, and once made, the choices are
unchangeable. This irreversibility of time constitutes a signiﬁcant limit to
freedom. [67]
The above contrasts with the concept of resoluteness, which for Heidegger relates
conceptually to a human way of self-disclosure or ‘‘disclosedness’’ (Erschlossen-
heit)[ 39]. Resoluteness is anticipatory in the sense that it is an attitude of projecting
one’s self-potentiality, i.e., possibilities of the self, without pretense of ‘‘escaping’’
the self’s thrownness. As Steven Heine puts it, ‘‘authenticity is the sober anxiety of
individualized Dasein [Da-sein, human being-there] fully founded within and
realized on the basis of its ﬁnitude. ‘Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of
escape, fabricated for the ‘overcoming’ of death; it is rather that understanding
which follows the call of conscience and which frees for death the possibility of
acquiring power over Dasein’s existence and of basically dispersing all fugitive
Self-concealments’’’ [68].
Precisely because every individual is engaged by the call of conscience
(Gewissen) while at the same time occupied, even tacitly governed by, his or her
thrownness, the individual is for the most part steeped in an attitude of mere
following (‘‘concernful curiosity’’) of an anonymous ‘‘They’’ (das Man) and thus
‘‘reticent’’ about taking up his or her own (eigen) possibilities of self-being. He or
she for the most part does as ‘‘They’’ do according to an everyday averageness of
‘‘idle chatter’’ (Gerede) and concernful curiosity that lack committed and sustained
interrogation. This reticence is itself a symptom of a fugitive self-concealment that
must be brought into disclosure for the individual human’s appropriation of resolute
being. Thus, Heidegger distinguishes between being authentic (eigentlich) and
being unauthentic (uneigentlich), the latter an obvious separation from the authentic
self-disclosure through which authentic possibilities of a resolute self are envisioned
and appropriated.
In short, the fact that the unity of animality and rationality is as yet
undetermined—i.e., not determined even conceptually as part of the concept of
metaphysical modernity—does not entail that humanity must move to such a
determination. This, as we have noted in reviewing Brassington’s remarks, is a
metaphysical project that is wholly problematic from the perspective of critiques
given in existential phenomenology, such as that of Heidegger. Thus, the
reductionist metaphysics that is at the base of biomedical research, such as stem
cell research, cannot be sustained.
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one need not be complacent, illusory, or despairing about what such research
portends for the human future—all of which Welie reviews in light of other
existentialist thought (Sartre, Marcel). Rather, Heidegger’s concept of anticipatory
resoluteness takes on more critical application. Consider Welie’s important
observation from Heidegger’s elucidation of human temporality: ‘‘the authenticity
of human life can only be discerned when its temporality is not reduced to a series
of present actions’’ [67]. This is precisely the problem with the reductionist
metaphysics of biotechnology such as stem cell research and its associated ethical
deliberation—human temporality is wholly ignored if not misconstrued, and thereby
the possibilities of individual and collective choice are compromised from the
beginning. Welie puts the point I wish to make this way in relation to Kant’s or the
Kantian concept of autonomy and its role as a fundamental principle of biomedical
ethics: one problematic aspect of the concept of autonomy is ‘‘its tendency to focus
on the present and to disregard the fact that human existence does not occur in time
but is itself temporal. On the other hand, the notion of authenticity—if understood in
the existentialist sense of the word—does reﬂect this portentous aspect of human
being by understanding human choice as promise rather than indeterminateness’’
[67]. To say human existence is itself temporal and not ‘‘in time’’ is to forego
conceiving time as a ‘‘thing’’ that is somehow merely and wholly ‘‘present.’’ What
does this mean more speciﬁcally? Welie answers:
Heidegger rejects any understanding of the past in terms of passed events:
That would be a case of mistakenly thinking the past in terms of the present, a
present gone by. Such a mistake is typical of everydayness as well as the
scientiﬁc preoccupation with the measurement of time. It completely
overlooks that it is only because of our past to which we can return, that
we are able to plan ahead into the future.
In line with Heidegger’s rejection of understanding the past as passed, we may
add that the future is not ‘‘no(thing).’’ It is real in so far as it enables choice.
But choice, unlike pure chance, is not a purely present phenomenon. My
decision at a given moment to do A rather than B would not be a genuine
choice if I had not the slightest certainty about what I was going to decide at
the next moment. If my freedom were absolute in that the future is always
fully open, I cannot plan (for the next moment upon conceiving the plan, I
might decide something to the contrary). For my free choice not only to be
free but to be a genuine choice, I must assume that my behavior in the
moments to come will not counteract my present decisions. Thus, every
decision I make about my own future has the nature of a promise. For there to
be any sense in planning ahead, such planning must entail a consequent
determination of the future and thus a limitation of my future freedom.
Conversely, I must be willing to be determined by my own past choices. For
there to be genuine free choice, I must freely limit my own freedom. [67]
This understanding of human choice applies equally, however different in degree,
to both individual and collective decisions. It applies, therefore, also to ethical and
policy deliberations about direction and expectations in a whole host of projects in
216 N. K. Swazo
123stem cell research and genetic engineering more generally. When such research is
governed by the reductionist attitude, the whole of human endeavor is reduced to an
undetermined mind and body unity of constituent parts, all of which are taken as
something merely present-at-hand and then as ‘‘ready-reserve’’ for manipulation by
this or that investigator. The consequence is that the temporal aspect of the human
being is forgotten at human peril, since the human being is never reducible to the
merely present-at-hand unity of animality (body) and rationality (mind). ‘‘The
essence of human life disappears out of sight if its temporal character is reduced to a
series of present actions’’ [67].
Engaging stem cell research post-metaphysically
Fredrik Svenaeus is an example of one philosopher who has recently articulated a
defense of therapeutic cloning via a post-metaphysical, i.e., Heideggerian, mode of
argument. He is concerned to underscore ‘‘an ontology that does not limit itself to
biological accounts, but instead focuses on the embryo’s place in a totality of
relevance surrounding and guiding a human practice,’’ i.e., embryonic stem cell
research [69]. In doing so, Svenaeus is attending to Heidegger’s phenomenological
instruction that a human life is intentional, ﬁlled with meaning that is at once
‘‘retentional’’ and ‘‘protentional.’’ This meaning is manifest as a referential context
of signiﬁcations that always goes beyond the merely present-at-hand to account for
both our human thrownness and our human anticipatory resoluteness. Thereby, a
fundamental ontology of the human being, such as the one Heidegger sought to
elucidate in Being and Time, accounts for human temporality without succumbing
to the reductionist failure of seeing the human future as a mere autopoiesis (self-
fabrication).
Autopoiesis is not without its challenges in bioethics: ‘‘…there is a strand of
contemporary thinking, discernible, for instance, in the writing of the more
conservative bioethicists, which sees autopoietic ambitions of humans as the
ultimate hubris, especially in debates on gene technology, cloning, embryo research,
and the like’’ [6]. Therapeutic research that employs the techniques of recombinant
DNA research is to be distinguished, as a matter of degree, from a program of
eugenics that advertently pursues ‘‘de novo enhancement of human nature.’’
Consider Alex Mauron’s observation that links critically to the reductionist
metaphysics identiﬁed by Brassington:
…the debate on eugenics is necessarily more narrow than the broader issues
raised by the program of homo faber sui ipsius [‘‘man, maker of himself’’], the
self-engineering of man. Nevertheless, it seems that whenever the issue of
technological change of human nature is broached, the notion of eugenics
comes to the fore. The broader, and in some sense more interesting, question
of whether it is legitimate for mankind to reshape its own nature tends to be
reduced to a narrower, genome-centered question, namely whether one should
or not allow intentional genomic changes. This illustrates an important strand
of current conventional wisdom: that the human genome is increasingly
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self-shaping of human nature, the genome will necessarily be the principal
substrate of this autopoietic endeavor. [70]
15
What many contemporary bioscientists do not understand (simply because it is not
their primary domain of directed research) is that the governing or ‘‘architectonic’’
discourse within which their research moves is one in which ‘‘the data of modern
biology’’ are being introduced rather haphazardly into ‘‘the classical ontological
framework’’ that begins with the ancient Greek ontology of ‘‘hylomorphism’’ (i.e.,
matter-form unity of body-mind/soul) and continues on into modern ontology in the
concept of the human being as rational animal (animal rationale). This is occurring
despite twentieth century and current post-metaphysical critiques, which is less a
criticism of scientists working in cell biology than of bioethicists who fail to
marshal philosophical thinking beyond superﬁcial appropriations of modern moral
theory (superﬁcial because of inadequate attention to the ontological and
epistemological bases of both utilitarianism/empiricism and deontology/rational-
ism). With the rise of science as a dominant mode of ‘‘knowledge’’ that is said to
have authority beyond mere ‘‘useless thinking,’’ such as philosophers are thought to
do, some scientists of course believe what Heidegger ﬁnds faulty. One scientist, for
example, argues ‘‘…Heidegger takes issue with the notion that can still be
inﬂuential in analytic philosophy, namely that ‘scientiﬁc thinking alone is the
authentic, rigorous thinking, that it alone can and must be made the measure even of
philosophic thinking’’’ [60].
A post-metaphysical—in this case, existential phenomenological—thinking that
properly grapples with the confounding challenges of stem cell research and genetic
engineering must do as Heidegger proposed in Being and Time. It must lay the
foundation of science in the sense of a ‘‘leap-ahead’’ (vor-ausspringen) solicitude
(Fu ¨rsorge, ‘‘concern for’’) that allows science its proper role, but subject to a
deliberative public discourse (Rede), rather than to this or that idle chatter (Gerede)
that is the sort of mere curiosity that lacks real engagement and interrogation of the
matter at hand.
16 The point of a leap-ahead solicitude is to enable those engaged in
the discourse to ‘‘become properly bound together (eigentliche Verbundenheit),’’
which then ‘‘makes possible the right relation to matters (die rechte Sachlichkeit),’’
and thereby achieves a ‘‘co-disclosure’’ (mitzuerschliessenheit)[ 19]. The idea of co-
disclosure expresses the unity of mutual contribution to the outcome of the matter at
hand, and thereby, to the determination of the way in which humans are who they
are (i.e., ‘‘co-exist’’ as ‘‘being-with,’’ Mitsein). What matters is the interaction of
each in the face of their mutual thrownness and anticipatory resoluteness before the
future, always unknown, uncertain, and ﬁnite in its possibilities. Absent such co-
disclosure, as Sloterdijk (echoing Heidegger) puts it, ‘‘homelessness is the
fundamental state’’ of the human being, manifest such that ‘‘misapprehensions in
the apprehension of the self are the rule’’ [72].
15 Here Mauron speaks of ‘‘genomic essentialism,’’ where the genome is assumed and socially
represented to be ‘‘the ontological core of an organism, determining both its individuality and its species
identity.’’
16 For a different view, see Paul Kurz [71].
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implications of biomedical research cannot substitute himself (i.e., impose his
determinate vision) for that of the bio-scientist—this would be a ‘‘leap-in’’
(einspringen) solicitude that is deﬁcient in relation. Rather, the bio-scientist himself
must understand that the research to which he commits himself always concerns,
ﬁrst and foremost, not a ‘‘what’’ (constituent part of a body, e.g., stem cell, embryo)
but a ‘‘who’’ in his and her existence—beings who have their own individual
(Da-sein) and collective (Mit-sein) projects of self-becoming that are not to be
superintended by the scientist’s research design as if it were some authoritatively
totalizing constraint on the research subject’s freedom to be. Further, and especially
urgent, the research scientist must understand that through his research project he
projects himself and other humans in a co-potentiality for being and thus commits
himself and others to a speciﬁc ontological determination. It is in this sense that the
research scientist is ‘‘responsible’’ and accountable to himself and to others in the
mode of his solicitude, whether deﬁcient (inconsiderate, indifferent, leap-in) or
authentically caring. Thus, Heidegger says, ‘‘When Dasein stands resolutely open it
can become the ‘conscience’ of others (Das entschlossene Dasein kann zum
‘Gewissen’ der Anderen werden)’’ [39].
The concept of conscience (Gewissen) as Heidegger understands it is essential to
an ethics of responsibility and the principle of authenticity inasmuch as ‘‘this
conscience is Dasein’s very openness to the excess of possibility’’ [73, italics
added], as Michael Lewis puts it—excess being precisely what is at issue in
contemporary stem cell research and genetic engineering. The excess is present
from the beginning in what is assumed to be the promise of ‘‘the technological ﬁx’’
for what ails humanity, whether in therapeutic and regenerative medicine, or
reproductive or enhancement genetic engineering. Here we have the threat of excess
in the sense of dangerous possibilities through which the whole of humanity may be
altered fundamentally according to such technological (‘‘anthropotechnological’’)
determinations.
17
Hence, the instrumental view of bio-technology misses what is essential. Charles
Sabatino observes, ‘‘Heidegger does not deﬁne technology strictly as an act of
achieving; but rather as a way of revealing’’ [75]. Indeed, Sabatino adds,
At ﬁrst glance, it may seem strange to refer to technology as a way of
revealing. Nevertheless, the recent achievements with the genome and
embryonic stem cells might actually help exemplify what Heidegger was
trying to say. The genetic code has been spiraling away within the encasing
of its double helix structure; and stem cells have been differentiating from out
of their primal status to form living organisms since well before the arrival of
humans within the world. Nevertheless, only quite recently have their
17 Consider, e.g., that the creation and use of pre-implantation human embryos ‘‘outside the womb’’
means that ‘‘the act of separation makes it possible to look at an embryo as a special kind of human
tissue,’’ even though ‘‘most of the ethicists and scientists who defend the instrumental position do not
adhere to this view. They do not embrace the possible reduction of an embryo to a tiny piece of cellular
tissue’’—although, nonetheless, the embryo’s ‘‘instrumental value… has to be measured by looking at the
goal for which it is used.’’ See here, van Leeuwen [14] and Sloterdijk’s multi-volume, Spa ¨hren [74],
wherein Sloterdijk speaks of ‘‘microspheres’’ of space-relation, such as that of the fetus-placenta.
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(trans-late: transferred) into a language of intelligibility that can be deciphered
through the lens of science and thereby made available to human scrutiny and
manipulation. [75]
These are, from the view of scientiﬁc progress, ‘‘achievements.’’ But these
engagements of nature are always more than that at base: ‘‘We forget that our doing,
by the very nature of how and where it takes place, is indeed a form of revealing’’
[75]. Research scientists and bioethicists are in need of a transformed comportment,
one that keeps them ever mindful that their basic way to be is one of revealing
worlds of possibilities; the biomedical sciences themselves are utterly revelatory in
a push at the limits of possibility. Sabatino states the need rather starkly:
Heidegger says there is hope for the world if and as the danger is perceived as
the danger. Somehow, the all-encompassing manner in which everything is
now open and accessible, that there may be no limits to what man can do, and
that all lies vulnerable might suddenly act as a lightning strike to shake us out
of the slumbers of the everyday business. It might dawn on us that everything,
including world itself is at risk; and thus we ourselves are at risk. Then we
might understand that we ourselves are the danger.[ 75, italics added]
To say we are the danger is daunting enough. To realize that, as Sabatino adds,
‘‘the danger haunting the technological era is that there is no retreat’’ [75, italics
added], is all the more revelatory of an occult anxiety circumscribing all human
actions that are motivated by technological instrumentality, but especially actions
that issue from the reductionist metaphysics incorporated into much of contempo-
rary science, including stem cell research. Anxiety (Angst, ‘‘one feels ill at ease,’’
‘‘es ist einem un-heimlich’’—‘‘un-heimlich’’ etymologically also means to be ‘‘un-
homely’’) here is a mood fundamentally different from the sort of fear (Furcht) that
has its known object.
18 In anxiety we are faced necessarily with both concealment
and disclosure simultaneously, thus with ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit); and conceal-
ment and disclosure both have their untold consequences for the way the human
world is conﬁgured by our individual and collective revelatory practices. Indeed,
says Heidegger, ‘‘our concernful awaiting ﬁnds nothing in terms of which it might
be able to understand itself…’’ [39]. In anxiety, one is faced with ‘‘the impossibility
of projecting oneself upon a potentiality-for being which belongs to existence…
Anxiety is anxious about naked Dasein as something that has been thrown into
uncanniness’’ [39]. The purposes of stem cell research (therapeutic/regenerative,
reproductive/enhancing), as projections of a human potentiality-for-being, are no
less subject to this anxiety, and it is essential to understand that ‘‘the discussion of
means and ends is therefore… visible… in disputes over moral limits and
competition between research groups all over the world. The setting of the limits
18 Heidegger says, ‘‘Fear is a fearing in the face of something threatening—of something which is
detrimental to Dasein’s factical potentiality-for-being, and which brings itself close… within the range of
the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand with which we concern ourselves’’ [76, p. 391]. The problem
here is that fear causes one to forget oneself in the face of that which threatens: ‘‘When one has forgotten
oneself and makes present a jumble of hovering possibilities, one thus makes possible that bewilderment
which goes to make up the mood-character of fear.’’
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by the human embryo. Setting limits can therefore only be considered as an act of
human responsibility’’ [14].
One cannot in all due conscience ignore or minimize the fact of danger as
irrational fear. Sloterdijk remarks there is ample reason for suspicion: ‘‘Due to
Hiroshima, humans have reason to believe that the most advanced technologies are
uninhibited and reason to distrust the Oppenheimers and Trumans of genetics’’ [72].
Heidegger was clear that our confrontation with the essence of technology is not a
matter of our being either optimistic or pessimistic, just as it is not a matter of our
being either ‘‘conservative’’ or ‘‘hostile’’ of scientiﬁc research or ‘‘liberal’’ and
‘‘enabling’’ of biotechnology. More accurately, in Heideggerian terms, the limits are
disclosed responsibly only in acts of anticipatory resoluteness, and this requires an
ethics of care (Sorge) that incorporates practices of leap-ahead solicitude among
bioethicists in their relation to stem cell research and genetic engineering. As Sunnie
D. Kidd writes, ‘‘Heidegger’s philosophical ground of self-responsibility of the
authentic self is fundamental to the therapeutic process. This movement toward the
authentic self, the consciousness of one’s own self, one’s possibilities, one’s
ﬁnitude, is the ground for the therapeutic encounter. The activation of the projective
function of consciousness releases our capacity for imagination’’ [77]. But the
imagination is not free—it is conditioned by human ﬁnitude. Only in the
appropriation of this comportment will bioethicists hold their authority in guiding
biomedical research away from excess and into resolute disclosure of the human
future. To do that, both biomedical research scientists and bioethicists must resist all
calculative thinking that would determine the human being to be ‘‘just one animal
among many.’’
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